CHURCH & STATE IN AMERICA

 

 

 

David Beutel

Period #4

AP US History

December 10, 1993

 

Citizens of the United States consider freedom of religion one of their most fundamental and sacred rights. Religious persecution was the motivation that brought most colonists from Europe to uncertain futures in America. The first two clauses of the first amendment of our Bill of Rights, known as the religion clauses affirms this foundational freedom. These clauses state, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."1 The first statement, known as the "establishment clause," is the basis of church-state separation, a doctrine first exposited as such in an 1802 letter Thomas Jefferson wrote to the Baptist Association of Danbury, Connecticut. He wrote:

Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between a man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers of government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should "make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between Church and State.2

Separation of church and state is a polarized and controversial subject. Probably everyone who has ever studied separation would agree that "[t]he First Amendment, in its attractive brevity, leaves much unstated and seems to take much for granted. Even its spirit is elusive."3 Many students of Constitutional law have rejected Jefferson's notion of strict separation and argued that the establishment clause was intended only to prevent an "established," or governmentally sponsored, religion. They base their views of original intent on studies of the founding era and the debate over the Bill of Rights. Although such studies may not lead one to the same conclusion, it does seem certain that what we know today as the "separation of church and state" is not what most of the Founding Fathers intended. Careful examination of the Jeffersonian wall, original intent, and the context of the Constitution highlights a more clear and accurate understanding.

US Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist, has remarked, "The 'wall of separation between church and state' is a metaphor based on bad history, a metaphor which has proved useless as a guide to judging. It should be frankly and explicitly abandoned."4 Former Chief Justice Warren Burger noted that the "line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier."5 Burger also stated that the "course of constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be an absolutely straight line...No perfect absolute separation is really possible."6 Jefferson's wall analogy, although popular among the average politician and American citizen, has received substantial criticism from the experts. Tax exemption status for religious organizations (which was upheld 8-1 in Walz v. Tax Commission, 1970) is perhaps the best example of why absolute separation is impossible. Revoking this status would "place American religions at the mercy of the state...mak[ing] possible the very religious persecution the Founding Fathers tried to avoid...Unquestionably, tax exemptions for religious institutions must continue if we are to have freedom of religion."7 However, tax exemptions are a special privilege granted by the government to religion, an "establishment" which Jefferson's wall analogy would expressly forbid. Richard McBrien recently wrote, "The issue, therefore is not so much the separation of religion from the state as it is the matter of their relationship. And to understand the nature of that relationship, Madison offered the far more serviceable metaphor: a line rather than a wall." Madison's line is found in an 1832 letter to Reverend Jasper Adams: "it may not be easy, in every possible case, to trace the line of separation between the rights of religion and the civil authority with such distinctness as to avoid collisions and doubts on unessential points." The first misconception about separation is that it is best described as a "high and impregnable"8 unmoving wall, which clearly divides the political from the religious. Madison felt that such a view was inaccurate, and would probably have agreed that "The wall has done what walls usually do: it has obscured the view. It has sent a simplistic air to the discussion of a very complicated matter. Hence it has caused confusion whenever it has been invoked. Far from helping to decide cases, it has made opinions and decisions unintelligible. The wall is offered as a reason. It is not a reason; it is a figure of speech."9 Dallin Oaks made these apt comments about Jefferson's wall:

The modern popularity of the wall metaphor should not conceal its inappropriateness as an expression of current church-state relationships. Certainly there is something anomalous about a wall that will admit a school bus [Everson v. Board of Education] without the 'slightest breach,' but is impermeable to prayer [Engel v. Vitale].

Writing about the future of the wall, Robert Hutchins found that "A man who proposes to erect a wall in the middle of a saturated solution and have the material on one side different from the material on the other should not be surprised at the failure of his experiment...the wall is really a permeable membrane and is getting more porous all the time"10 While Madison's line of separation is probably the best description of church-state relations, others have suggested such barriers as a picket fence where "pickets can be added from time to time, thus strengthening the fence, or they can just about as easily be removed, thus weakening it...In recent decades both groups have busied themselves at the barrier, some trying to implant more pickets, others trying to pull them up."11 The wall, line, and fence metaphors are all clear explanations of the barrier concept--that there is a boundary between the ideal realm of government and that of religion. However, this barrier is rarely straight, wide, and obvious--not even theoretically. Jefferson's wall was specifically cited in two Supreme Court cases: Reynolds v. United States (1878) and Everson v. Board of Education (1947). In both cases, the invoking of the wall only muddied the Court's explanation of the case. In Reynolds, a polygamy case, "[t]he wall arose...because the Chief Justice wanted to use another phrase in Jefferson's letter to support his decision: he could not edit the letter to leave out the wall. The remark of Jefferson on which the Chief Justice relied was that the powers of government could reach only the actions of men, not their opinions."12 After resurrecting the obscure Danbury letter and using the wall metaphor for the first time since Jefferson had in 1802, Chief Justice Morrison Waite wrote: "Coming as this does from an acknowledged leader...it may be accepted almost as authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the [First] Amendment thus secured."13 Regardless of the fact that this testimony contradicts Jefferson's own, as we will shortly see, one must realize that Waite turned and declared polygamy illegal, thus tearing down the wall he had just erected! Then, in Everson, Justice Hugo Black spoke of the wall as "high and impregnable"--"strong words, but due to the particulars of the case, irrelevant ones...As Robert H. Jackson noted in his dissent, '[T]he undertones of the opinion, advocating complete and uncompromising separation between church and state, seem utterly discordant with its conclusion yielding support to their commingling in educational matters...'"14 The Court found strict separation an unworkable doctrine, yet it established strict separation as the precedent for all church-state cases since Everson. In 1985, Rehnquist commented,"Whether due to its lack of historical support or its practical unworkability, the Everson 'wall' has proven all but useless as a guide to sound constitutional adjucation...But the greatest injury of the wall notion is its mischevious diversion of judges from the actual intentions of the drafters of the Bill of Rights."15 Even though Jefferson was an important Founding Father, there are several good reason for rejecting his wall metaphor as the final authority on separation. First, Jefferson was in France during the Constitutional Convention and the drafting of the Bill of Rights. Jefferson himself corrected Dr. Joseph Priestly when Priestly wrote an article that portrayed Jefferson as a major participant in the "thought and work of the Constitution."16 Jefferson wrote, "One passage in the paper you enclosed me must be corrected. It is the following. 'And all say it was yourself more than any other individual, that planned and established it,' i.e. the Constitution. I was in Europe when the Constitution was planned, and never saw it till after it was published."17 He also wrote, "I wrote strongly to Mr. Madison, urging the want of provision for the freedom of religion, [press, fair trial, habeas corpus, etc.]...This is all the hand I had in what related to the Constitution."18 Further, Jefferson failed in practice to use his own "wall of separation" ideal. In 1803, he gave support to the Kaskaskia Indian Treaty, which promised funds to build a Catholic Church and support its priest.19 He also had no objections when religious bodies used municipal buildings for worship.20 Jefferson conformed to Wahington's and Adam's inclusion of prayer in their first official presidential acts, as did Madison.21 Justice Reed pointed out in his dissent in McCullum v. Board of Education (1948) that "Jefferson himself, with Madison's approval, had worked out a scheme by which the University of Virginia could see to it that all students received religious instruction."22 Furthermore, Jefferson cannot be looked to as the authority because his views on religion in government were in the minority among the Founders. For example, Jefferson's original draft of the Declaration of Independence refered to God only once. The other Founders must have thought that one reference was not enough, for they put God into the document in three other places.23 It should be pointed out that Washington (who, precedent-consious, never did anything he feared was unconstitutional), Adams, and Madison all issued proclamations of days of thanksgiving and prayer, usually in "nonsecretarian language.24 Jefferson was the only Founding Father who believed such proclamations were an absolutely impermissible form of religious establishment. Elliot Beard concludes his assessment of the wall by stating, "the assumption--that religious freedom can be effected only by the utter disconnectedness of our political system from any ecclesiastical ones--has always been wrong. The interests of both always will and should intersect in a multitude of ways. Which is why, for more than 100 years, Jefferson's little note about the wall has been, not a cornerstone, but a stray pebble on the rocky shoals of church and state."25 The primary misconception about the wall of separation is that it can function as an ideal or even a reasonable explanation of church-state relationships. It is clear that such a notion of strict separation is invalid, especially since even Jefferson, its only prominent proponent, found that when "Put to real-life tests, it seemed, the wall left a little to be desired."26 Given that strict separation is an invalid interpretation, we are likely to agree with Elizabeth Lesly that "[t]he First Amendment, to put it simply, prohibits both state sponsorship of and state hostility toward religion. Government relations with religious bodies must fall in the neutral zone between."27

Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner said, "Every Constitution embodies the principles of its framers. It is a transcript of their minds. If its meaning in any place is open to doubt...we cannot err if we turn to the framers."28 Adopting Sumner's attitude, the Constitutional student should examine the original intent of the founders to better understand the complex church-state relationship and meaning of the First Amendment. To the early American patriots, religious establishment epitomized the evils of European and colonial theocracy, to the detriment of both church and state. The evolution of the religous clauses began during the arguments about ratification by the states without a specific list of guaranteed rights. Several states sent lists of recommended amendments to Congress when they ratified the Constitution. Virginia's recommended religious freedom amendment stated that "no particular religious sect or society ought to be favored or established, by law, in preference of others."29 New York's, North Carolina's and Rhode Island's recomendations were almost identical.30 At the opening of the first Congress on June 8, 1989, Madison presented this suggestion for the religious amendment: "The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience in any matter or in any respect be infringed."31 A House Committee reworded his suggestion to state: "No religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed." This proposal was brought before the House for argument on August 15. Several congressmen gave their opinions, including the fear that this wording "might be thought to have a tendency to abolish religion altogether" and that the elements of the clauses should be transposed. Several expressed support and Sherman dissavowed the need for a Bill of Rights. Then Madison said "he apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law . . . [T]o prevent [infringement of the rights of concience and the establishment of a national religion] he presumed the amendment was intended, and he thought it as well expressed as the nature of the language would admit."After Huntington declared a fear that the wording "might be taken to such lattitude as to be extremely harmful to the cause of religion," Madison suggested the that "the word national [be] inserted before religion...He believed that the people feared one sect might obtain a preeminance, or two combine together, and establish a religion to which they would compel others to confrom. He thought if the word national was introduced, it would point the amendment directly to the object it was intended to prevent." This launched Mr. Gerry into an attack on the word "national," and the problems which had resulted from the "antifederalist" labeling. "Mr Madison withdrew his motion, but observed that the words 'No national religion shall be established by law' did not mean the government was a national [as opposed to federal] one." Subsequently, the House passed a new suggestion: "Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing the rights of conscience."32 Rehnquist commented on these proceedings: "It seems indisputable from these glimpses of Madison's thinking, as reflected by the actions on the floor of the House in 1789, that he saw the amendment as designed to prohibit the establishment of a national religion"33 On August 20, Fisher Ames suggested another proposal to the House, reading "Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience." In the Senate, this wording was changed to "Congress shall make no law establishing one religious sect or society in preference to others, nor shall the rights of conscience be infringed." On September 3, the Senate passed another version: "Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." On September 9, the Senate adopted its final version: "Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of relgion."34 The House rejected this proposal and a joint-committee from both houses was formed to create a compromise amendment. This wording, the First Amendment as we know it today, was passed by both houses on Sepetember 25. In some ways, the diction of the Congressional proposals gives support to both broad and narrow interpretations of the establishment clause. However, it seems that overall, Congress's numerous drafts support the narrow interpretation, i.e. that separation was meant to prevent the establishment of a national church. After so much debate and rewording, it seems likely that the Congressmen were more inclined to accept the joint-committe's proposal than continue to squabble over minor wording arguments, especially if the understanding of the intent were fairly consistant and ubiquitous at the time. Kenneth Wald observed that even though establishment was "understood to forbid only actions that treated religious groups unequally [before 1947], establishment was [subsequently] seen to encompass many activities that appeared to favor religion in general."35 Mark Noll believes that one of the founders' "main goals was to avoid the confusion of religious and governmental categories that had prevailed in Europe to some extent in colonial America. This confusion led to political tyranny through the agency of religion or religious persecution through the agents of government. It was an entanglement that, as the Founders saw it, always harmed religion and always tempted authorities to exert more power than by nature and the command of God they possessed."36 Franklin's famous dictum on separation is, "When a religion is good...it will support itself and when it cannot support itself and God does not care to support it, so that professors are obliged to call for help of the civil power, it is the sign...of its being a bad one."37 The belief that error, not Truth, needed government support, was generally accepted as the basis for separation as a positive goal.

The final topic to be addressed is the context of the Constitution. The context refers to the circumstances, cultural fabric, and religious identity underlying the document and the founding era, which help us understand the Constitution's limitations, scope, and implied intent. Thomas Jefferson stated the importance of the context principle in this recommendation to Justice William Johnson: "On all the questions of construction, we must carry ourselves back to the time when the Constitution was adopted, recollect the spirit manifested in the debates, and instead of trying what meaning may be squeezed out of the text, or invented against it, conform to the probable one in which it was passsed."38 The Constitutional context reveals three important beliefs central to the Foundersí intentions, namely that: 1) Morality and religion are the basis for democratic success; 2) Religious influence on government is both desirable and necessary; and 3) Separation was not intended to define religion in terms of non-religion. The founders were in agreement that American government was predicated on morality and the belief that the quality of a nation's citizens determines national prosperity and happiness. The most clear statements of this belief comes from George Washington's First Inaugural Address (April 30, 1789) and his Farewell Address (September 17, 1796). In his first inaugural address, Washington specifically addressed the role of religion in Americans and in their new government:

No people can be bound to acknowledge and adore the Invisible Hand [of God] which conducts the affairs of men more than those of the United States...[T]he foundation of our national policy will be laid in the pure and immutable principles of private morality...[T]here is no truth more thoroughly established than that there exists in the economy and course of nature an indissoluble union between virtue and happiness.39

It is interesting that Washington never directly mentioned "God" in his speech, though it was full of allusions to the Creator. Precedent-conscious, Washington was careful not to promote any particular religion; but it is clear that he believed religion in general was critical to government. Washington's Farewell Address includes these warnings to the fledgling nation:

Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotism, who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness, the firmest props of the duties of men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect and cherish them. A volume could not trace all their connection with private and public felicity. Let it simply be asked, Where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation desert? . . . And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion . . . [R]eason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.40

Washington would not have called subversion of religion unpatriotic if he had intended to keep religion out of the government. John Adams said, "We have no government armed with power capable of contending with human passions unbridled by morality and religion...Our constitution was made only for a moral and a religious people. It is wholly inadequate for any other."41 In 1685, John Locke had written much to the same effect that "the case of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate, because his power consists only in outward force; but true and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to God."42 This view can also be seen in the Danbury letter, where it states that government compulsion extends only to actions; thought is the realm of religion. The Federalist Papers, particularly Madison's 10th Federalist, focused primarily on the inherent evils in human character and tendency toward faction, using that basis to explain why separation of powers was the best way to maintain government integrity and union.43 Not only did the Founders agree that religion is necessary for public morality, but they also recognized religion as the reason for the existence of democratic ideals and individual rights. Jefferson said, "And can the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have removed their own firm basis- a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are the gift of God?"44 The Declaration of Independence also affirms the origin of natural rights: "All men are created equal and endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights..." Pennsylvania Governor Morris stated, "Religion is the only solid base of good morals; therefore education should teach the precepts of religion, and the duties of man towards God."45 Justice James Wilson, who signed the Constitution, believed that "Christianity is part of the common law [of America]."46 The Founders considered morality and religion part of American common law--unwritten, but foundational legal doctrine. The founders didn't want religion removed from government, but wanted "a critical distance between the institutional life of the churches and the institutional life of the government."47 James Madison more clearly defined the role of religion on public morality when he said, ìWe have staked the whole future of American civilization, not upon the power of government, far from it. We have staked the future of all our political institutions...upon the capacity of each and all of us to govern ourselves according to the Ten Commandments of God.î48 Historical evidence indicates that today's concern about the unconstitutionality of religious influences in the government is a purely modern-day phenomenon. On June 28, 1787, after weeks of particularly harsh representation arguments at the Constitutional Convention, Benjamin Franklin spoke in favor of opening each session in prayer: "...the longer I live, the more convincing proofs I see of this truth- that God governs in the affairs of men. And if a sparrow cannot fall to the ground without his notice, is it probable that an empire can rise without his aid? We've been assured in the sacred writing that, 'Except the Lord build the house, they labor in vain that build it.'...[W]ithout his concurring aid we shall succeed in this political building no better than the Builders of Babel...49 Franklin's sincere belief that God was critically involved in government led him to believe that prayer (a form of religion) should be involved in the Convention (a form of government). "Religion was to be a context for political behavior (many would have said the necessary context), not a concern of the political process itself."50 Mark Noll wrote,

The founders' 'science of politics' was put to use a social setting in which the dominant assumptions about public virtue and political morality were more or less Christian...The Founders relied upon traditional, largely Christian values as a framework for the Constitution. They did not, however, address the question of how the Constitution was to function if the supporting culture changed. By...avoiding the issue of where [individual] liberties were rooted, ...the meaning of crucial Constitutional concepts like "freedom" and "liberty" always remain subject to the majority opinion...So long as the values of the culture in which the Constitution functioned did not change greatly, the absence of explicit statements on these points was not a major problem. When that day arrived [when religion faded in American culture], the intuitive character of the Constitution became a bane instead of the substantial blessing it had been in its own generation.51

Even the Supreme Court has at times agreed with the axiom that "[t]he strands of politics and religion are wound together today, just as they have been throughout our history."52 Religion cannot be removed from its position in public affairs, and the Founders would never have considered its exclusion a legitimate expression of separation. The basic thrust of the context arguments is that governmental "benevolent neutrality" toward religion should not be construed so as to result in hostility, or even indifference to religion, often accomplished by supporting irreligion. So long as government support for religion does not include preferential treatment for a perticular creed, there is nothing historically indicative of an intent to put religion and irreligion on the same level. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story (appointed in 1811) believed that,

We are not to attribute [the First Amendment's] prohibition of a national religious establishment to an indifference to religion in general, and especially to Christianity, (which none could hold in more reverence, than the framers of the Constitution) . . . Probably, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and of the [First] Amendment, . . . the general, if not the universal sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive encouragement from the State . . . An attempt to level all religions, [making them equal to irreligion] and to make it a matter of state policy to hold all in utter indifference, would have created universal disapprobation, if not general indignation.53

As Richard McBrien writes, ìThere is no historical evidence that the founders, with the exception of a few extreme deists and agnostics among them, ever interpreted the principles of nonestablishment and uncoerced consent to mean that government ought to be completely indifferent to religion. On the contrary, they said over and over again that religion provided truths that were essential for public order and stability."54 In 1952, the Court declined to "preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe."55 This unexpected ruling, more faithful to the Framers than most post-Everson jurisprudence, declared that the Constitution did not place irreligion on equal footing with religion. In 1963, Justice Porter argued that the banning of religion from schools in Schempp established "a religion of secularism, or at least government support for the beliefs of those who think that religious exercises should be conducted only in private."56 In 1948, Justice Jackson stated, "I think it remains to be demonstrated whether it is possible, even if desirable,...completely to isolate and cast out of secular education all that some people may reasonably regard as religious instruction...The fact is, for good or for ill, nearly everything in our culture worth transmitting, everything which gives meaning to life, is saturated with religious influences..."57 The secularization of society has in large part undermined the moral context of the Constitution, and made many Americans overlook its existence. Though the Founders advocated separation, the context of the Constitution makes it clear that separation meant the institutional separation of religion and government, not the exclusion of religion free-exercise in political arenas.

"If a constitutional theory has no basis in the history of the amendment it seeks to interpret, is difficult to apply and yields unprincipled results, I see little use in it," said Chief Justice Rehnquist about the Court's position on separation.58 Since Emerson (1947), the Supreme Court has based its church-state rulings on a misunderstanding of separation. These rulings have frequently been contradictory and arbitrary, as the Court has struggled to understand the religion clauses and the proper relationship of religion and government. In the last decade, the Court declared moments of silence unconstitutional, then upheld the right for towns to pay for and display crËches (manger scenes) with tax money. The test now used is the "Lemon 3-Prong Test"59 This three-part test, which comes from the 1971 Lemon v. Kurtzman ruling,60 is sometimes used and sometimes ignored. The Court has been inconsistent with its interpretations and means of jurisprudence-and in such an important area of law, the Court and the American people need a better understanding of the issues. Strict separation is neither constitutional nor informed nor wise. It is contrary to the context of the Constitution, and imcompatible with the original intent of any of the Founders but Jefferson-and not very compatible with even his intent. While "separation" appears in no founding document, it is a fundamental and mandatory part of America's civil government and civil religion, but not in the extreme manner now understood. An 1872 Ohio state Supreme Court ruling provides a concise explanation of the reasons the Founders advocated separation: "United with government, religion never rises above merest superstition; united with religion, government never rises above the merest despotism."61 To understand how separation functioned in its correct form (before it was distorted by the Supreme Court), we benefit from reading Alexis de Tocqueville's 1831 observations in Democracy in America. Tocqueville noted,

The religious atmosphere of the country was the first thing that struck me on arrival to the United States . . . [I]n France I had seen the spirits of religion and of freedom almost always marching in opposite directions. In America, I found them intimately linked together in joint reign over the same land . . . [The main reason for the amount of religious activity in America is] separation of church and state . . . throughout my stay in America I met nobody, lay or cleric, who did not agree about that. . . . [R]eligion in America takes no direct part in the government of society, but it must be regarded as the first of their political institutions. . . . I am sure that [all Americans] think it necessary to the maintenance of republican institutions. That is not the view of one class or party among the citizens, but of the whole nation; it is found in all its ranks63

We can say with certainty that separation was intended to protect government from control by religion and to protect religion from control by government. If we look at the reasons the Founders gave for separation, it becomes clear that separation was meant to keep religion and government from corrupting one another, not to keep the two on opposite sides of a high, confrontational wall. Religious practice and democratic government spring from a common root-individual liberty-and in a sense, individual liberty is their mutual goal. We must remember Richard Neuhaus's warning that religion is the only force which can prevent government from turning totalitarian: "Once religion is reduced to nothing more than privatized conscience, the public square has only two actors in it-the state and the individual. Religion as a mediating structure--a community that generates and transmits moral values-is no longer available."64 In 1988, the Williamsburg Charter was drawn up in commemoration of the bicentennial of the religious clauses of the First Amendment. The charter was signed by over two hundred prominent Americans, and provides a amazingly fair and accurate portrayal of the American church and state relationship-the way it was, the way it is, and the way it should be. The charter succinctly proclaims the proper and intended role of separation: "The No Establishment Clause separates Church from State but not religion from politics or public life. It prevents the confusion of religion and government which has been a leading source of repression and coercion throughout history."65

 

ENDNOTES

 

1 Lowell, The Great Church-State Fraud, p. 8.

2 Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, no page number.

3 Tussman, The Supreme Court on Church & State, p. xiii.

4 Davis, Original Intent, p. 97. (From dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree, 1985)

5 Beard, "When is a Wall not a Wall?" (from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 1971)

6 McBrien, Caesar's Coin, p. 67. (from Walz v. Tax Commission, 1970)

7 Weiss, God and Government, p. 47, 48.

8 Beard. (From Everson v. Board of Education, 1947)

9 Hutchins, "The Future of the Wall." The Wall between Church and State, p. 19.

10 Ibid, p.20.

11 Gay, Church and State, p. 27-28.

12 Op. Cit., p.17.

13 Beard, "When is a Wall not a Wall?"

14 Ibid.

15 Davis, Original Intent, p. 97.

16 Barton, "Thomas Jefferson and the First Amendment."

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 McBrien, p. 64.

20 Wald, Religion and Politics in the United States, p. 138.

21 Davis, p. 75.

22 Hutchings, p. 18.

23 Barton, "Thomas Jefferson and the First Ammendemnt"

24 Davis, p. 142.

25 Beard.

26 Ibid.

27 Lesly, "Pennies from Heaven."

28 Davis, p. 41.

29 St. John, Forge of Union Anvil of Liberty, p. 239.

30 Op. Cit., p. 54.

31 Ibid, p. 55.

32 Ibid, p. 99-101. (from "Annals"-Congressional record of debate)

33 Ibid, p. 102. (from dissent in Wallace v. Jaffre, 1985)

34 Ibid, p. 58-60. (Entire discourse after House)

35 Wald, p.143.

36 Noll, One Nation Under God?, p.69.

37 Lowell, p. 192.

38 Barton, "Article VI," p. 3.

39 Commager (ed.) Documents of American History, p. 152.

40 Ibid, p. 173

41 "America's Godly Heritage"

42 Oaks (ed.), The Wall Between Church and State, p. 36.

43 Noll, p. 68-69.

44 "America's Godly Heritage"

45 Barton,"Thomas Jefferson and the First Ammendment."

46 Barton, "Article VI," p.5.

47 Noll, p. 66.

48 "America's Godly Heritage."

49 St. John, Constitutional Journal, p.77-78 and "America's Godly Heritage."

50 Noll, p. 65,67,74.

51 Ibid, p.194-196.

52 Weiss, God and Government, p. x.

53 Barton, "Article VI," p. 5.

54 McBrien, p.54.

55 Davis, p. 71. (from Zorach v. Clauson, 1952, written by William Douglas)

56 Op. Cit., p. 93. (from dissent in Abington School District v. Schempp, 1963)

57 Hutchins, p. 19. (from concurring opinion in McCullum v. Board of Education, 1948.)

58 Op. Cit., p. 34. (from dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree, 1985)

59 Ibid, p. 78. (To pass the three tests, legislation must have a secular purpose; the primary effect must neither hinder nor advance religion; and it must not result in excessive entanglement of church and state).

60 The three tests were first incorporated in Lemon, but had been used by the Court in earlier cases. The secular purpose and primary effect tests were first used in Abington School District v. Abington (1963), and the excessive entanglement test was first used in Walz v. Tax Commission (1970).

61 Sherrow, Separation of Church and State, p.42-43.

62 Ibid, p. 34.

63 Colson, Kingdoms in Conflict, p. 228 and McBrien, p. 37.

64 Wald, p. 357.

65 Sherrow, p. 106, 110.

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

 

BOOKS:

1. Colson, Charles. Kingdoms in Conflict. New York: William Morrow/Zondervan Publishing House, 1987.

2. Commager, Henry (ed.) Documents of American History. New York: Appleton-Century- Crofts, 1934.

3. Davis, Derek. Original Intent. New York: Prometheus Books, 1991.

4. Gay, Kathlyn. Church and State. Brookfield, CN: The Milbrook Press, 1992.

5. Jefferson, Thomas. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson. Washington, D.C.: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1904.

6. Lowell, C. Stanley. The Great Church-State Fraud. Washington: Robert B. Luce, Inc., 1973.

7. McBrien, Richard. Caesar's Coin. New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1987.

8. Noll, Mark. One Nation Under God? San Fransisco: Harper & Row, Publisher, 1988.

9. Oaks, Dallin. (ed.) The Wall Between Church and State. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963.

10. Sherrow, Victoria. Separation of Church and State. New York: Impact Books-Franklin Watts, 1992.

11. St. John, Jeffrey. Constitutional Journal. Ottawa, IL: Jameson Books, Inc., 1987.

12. St. John, Jeffrey. Forge of Union Anvil of Liberty. Ottawa, IL: Jameson Books, Inc., 1992.

13. Tussman, Joseph (ed.) The Supreme Court on Church & State. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962.

14. Wald, Kenneth. Religion and Politics in the United States. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1992.

15. Weiss, Ann. God and Government. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982.

 

PERIODICALS:

1. Beard, Elliot. "When is a Wall not a Wall?" Washington Monthly, April 1991.

2. Lesly, Elizabeth. "Pennies from Heaven." Washington Monthly, April 1991, p. 40-45.

 

VIDEO:

1. "America's Godly Heritage." Austin, TX: Wallbuilders, Inc, 1990.

 

OTHER:

1. Barton, David. "An Investigation of the Meaning of Article VI of the Constitution." (report)

2. Barton, David. "Thomas Jefferson and the First Amendment." (phamplet)

 

NOTE: Magazine articles from SIRS reference system; consequently page numbers are not always available.

 

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