December 12, 1996

The crisis of modernity-humanityнs present condition of alienation and anomie-has inspired the works and theories of many thinkers during the twentieth century. On numerous fronts, from existentialism to art to film theory, modern thinkers have sought to solve the modern problem through nonrational means, while holding to a rationalistic epistemology. As a result, they must make logical leaps that significantly compromise the validity of their system. Siegfried Kracauer presents such a system in his Theory of Film. In it, Kracauer surveys the desolate condition of modern humanity, places the blame on abstractness, and presents film as a redemptive tool for the salvation of estranged modern individuals and their societies. To his credit, Kracauer points to the мhunger for lifeо as an unmet, nonrational need in the modern individual, and correctly attributes it to a waning of ideology. Unfortunately, Kracauer proves to be an uncritical believer in rationalism, and in its corollary, progress, even while the failure of rationalism to generate meaning forces him to seek truths mediated by revelational mysticism. By assuming rationalism and relativism, he dooms his redemptive project from the start and turns his theory into a weak and dangerous escapism, further marred by inconsistencies between his rationalistic epistemology and his nonrational view of humanity. Nonetheless, Kracauerнs blind spots point the way to a truer, more satisfactory model, which involves a reassessment of modernity and a return to Christian revelational ideology, which claims the existence of a God who has revealed himself in the Bible (Carnell 175).

Before we commence with this critique of Kracauer, a note on methodology is due. Our method in this paper proceeds through three basic questions: 1) Does the present state of the world present us with problems, questions, and needs we need to address (i.e. the crisis of modernity)? 2) If yes, where should we start looking-in other words, are our problems, questions, and needs more likely to be resolved through self-generated truth or through truth revealed from an outside, infinite source? 3) If revealed truth offers a better chance for meeting our needs in more substantial ways, which, if any, of the systems claiming to be revealed truth are intellectually tenable and fruitful today? Due to the limited scope of this paper, we will limit consideration of purportedly revealed truths to Christian revelational ideology. This limitation, while considerable, can be mitigated to some extent by the fact that Biblical claims to exclusivity cannot coexist with other claims of revelation.

Our test for intellectual tenability will be "systematic consistency." (Carnell 108). This test validates a system on the basis of "vertical fitting of the facts," i.e. consistency with the facts of nature, of ourselves as humans, and of history-both the specific historical events in themselves and as parts of a historical process-and on the basis of "horizontal self-consistency," i.e. internal non-contradiction. The vertical criteria requires that a proposed system be consistent with the totality of human existence-systematically. Our test for fruitfulness will validate a system only if it solves the modern problem and provides guidance with adequate safeguards against abuse. Both tests are merely an expression of the general observation that "rational probability is the guide of life" (Carnell 113). Any system which our test finds untenable and/or unfruitful will be thus invalidated, while any system which our test finds tenable and fruitful will be validated. At that point, the decision to accept or reject the system must be made. While this methodology does not claim to be able to arrive at an absolutely certain, positively proven solution, it does offer a solution true to itself and to the universe in which we live-which is as much as any system broad enough to offer real solutions can claim.

Kracauerнs method can be outlined from his epilogue to Theory of Film as follows: 1) Holistic belief systems have been waning; 2) Modern humanity is ideologically shelterless, a fact highlighted by the failed attempts of Enlightenment liberalism and ideological revivalism to remedy the situation; 3) Science and technology have conditioned people to perceive themselves and the world in destructively abstract ways; 4) Modern humanity must first rid itself of abstractness if we are to мescape from spiritual nakednessо (296); 5) Film offers humans a unique way to experience reality, thus overcoming abstractness and opening the way for solving the modern problem; 6) Film can now play a threefold redemptive role: мmak[ing] the world our home,о generating a мfamily of man,о and allowing humans to self-generate ideological propositions in a мbottom to topо manner consistent with philosophical materialism (304, 309). In the next few pages, we will examine the problems of Kracauer's methodology and conclusions, then evaluate the Christian revelational model as a potentially superior solution to the crisis of modernity.

A summary of Christian revelational claims is due before we can consider it as an alternative to Kracauer's rationalistic-mystical system.

The Christian view of revelation is fourfold: 1) Revelation through the universe, 2) Revelation through human nature, 3) Revelation through the Incarnation of God in Jesus, and 4) Propositional revelation through the Bible. We could consider each separately, but in this paper, it makes since to concentrate on Biblical revelation, because it is the most comprehensive form of revelation and includes all the other forms as well as much they do not include. More importantly, Godнs supreme revelation of himself in Jesus can only be known (beyond a few details from Roman and Jewish historians) to us in the twentieth century through the Bible, hence its foundational epistemological importance. It should be noted that the revelational claims on natural grounds (мgeneral revelation,о i.e. 1 and 2) and on supernatural grounds (мspecial revelation,о i.e. 3 and 4) are not a bifurcation of epistemology, such as the Thomian nature-grace scheme, in which natural revelation is demonstrated through reason and grace revelation is accepted on the unsubstantiated authority of the Church (more on this later) or Kracauerнs rationalism-mysticism scheme. The two classes of revelation are part of the same major premise, the existence of a God who has revealed himself in the Bible, which is wholly testable by reason through the test of systematic consistency. Like any testable hypothesis, Biblical revelation can, at least theoretically, be falsified.

Now, our methodology does not assume a priori that purportedly revealed Truth can withstand the scrutiny of reason. It does, however, demand that ideology-because it offers the most hope for resolving the modern crisis-be thoroughly and rigorously refuted before finding cause to explore the necessarily diluted solutions that relativism might be able to offer. It is just this thorough refutation, so conspicuously absent in Kracauerнs theory, that, had he attempted it, might have enabled him to see through his rationalistic assumption of progress and to then embark on a fruitful reassessment of modernity. By instead calling for self-generation of knowledge through reason, Kracauer automatically limits himself to relativized possibilities, which are necessarily diluted forms of ideology in that they are weaker-they can make no claims to absolute, objective Truth or universals, from which meaning may be derived for particulars, including humans-and in that they are dangerous-they provide no stable guidance for mankind, or for film, which has enormous potential to take humans down avenues they would be better off avoiding entirely. These two weaknesses, the lack of meaning and the lack of guidance, may be considered the epitome of the anomic state of modern humanity as well as an invalidation of relativistic solutions by the test of fruitfulness. Before looking at particular problems in the application of relativism, we also need to point out that relativism is logically self-refuting, i.e. invalidated by the test of horizontal self-consistency. Relativism, in claiming that there are no absolutes, is making an absolute claim. It pretends to have a knowledge about absolutes to which a relativized system cannot allow it access. Thus both logically, and as we will see, practically, relativism is radically refuted.

Lest I be accused of uncritical partiality to absolutes, I should point out that Kracauer, too, agrees that ideology, if sustainable, offers a superior solution than does relativism. Kracauer and I diverge in that I go on to insist on giving ideology precedence in my methodological scheme, while Kracauer feels justified in ignoring it altogether in his. Kracauer argues that overcoming abstraction is worthwhile even if afterwards мwe may still not be able to cast anchor in ideological certainties, yet at least we stand a chance of finding . . . the world that is oursо (296, italics mine), implying the higher desirability of ideological certainty. In another context, Kracauer quotes Emile Durkheim as saying, мonly reflection can guide us in life, after [the eclipse of established beliefs]о (289). Kracauer then comments, мGuide us in what direction?,о pointing out the undesirable lack of guidance which quickly follows the eclipse of ideology and is inherent in relativism. A few lines later, Kracauer cites Ernest Renanнs argument that мhuman reason by itself alone is hardly in a position to provide norms and sanctions able to regulate our moral life as effectively as did religion with its supernatural commandmentsо and that мmorality may deteriorate in inverse ratio with the advance of scienceо (289). In all three cases, Kracauer illuminates the superiority of ideology over relativism. After freely acknowledging this superiority, however, Kracauer elects to follow a methodology which elevates relativism not only to the favored position of consideration, but to the exclusive position.

At the root of his theory, Kracauer holds an almost religious conception of reality, human needs, and spirituality. Kracauer describes the modern individual as мhung[ry] for lifeо-having a мdeep-rooted, all but metaphysical desire [for] . . . life in its inexhaustibility. . .о (168). While he claims this desire is мall but metaphysical,о other statements he makes indicate that his conception does include the metaphysical and the ideological. For example, he writes that the total human personality consists of the мharmonious union of nature and лspiritно (Kracauer, Ornament 83). Also, he observes that м. . . the world we master technologically is only part of the reality accessible to the senses, the heart. The concept of life may also designate this reality which transcends the anemic space-time world of scienceо (170). In various places, he describes modern individuals as spiritually naked, ideologically shelterless [!], fragmented, nostalgic for life, lacking concreteness and guidance, struggling to account for the forces behind their destiny and behind the world, uneasy about the absence of unifying incentives to determine meaningful goals, drifting without limit or direction, and estranged from nature (298, 296, 167, 169, 170, 171, 288, 290, 294). Furthermore, he indicates his spiritual goals for film by quoting two film theorists who envision cinema as a means of directing the eye мfrom the corporeal to the spiritualо and as мa powerful ferment of spiritualityо (309). He also observes that the problem with abstractness is that it мobstructs our intercourse with images and meanings.о Meanings belong to the ideological sphere. Later, he mentions the challenge issued by abstractness to мassimilate values that delimit our horizonо (296). Values again are ideological. In all these examples, Kracauer exhibits a keen awareness of and significant concern for the spiritual, metaphysical, and ideological. Kracauer on several occasions makes the causal connection between the modern condition and the waning of ideology, suggesting that what modern humanity needs is exactly that which ideology previously provided. Since the reality humans must experience to satisfy their мhunger for lifeо includes the metaphysical and ideological, Kracauerнs solution must (and it does) permit access to these higher realities. However, as we will see, it does so through mysticism, which is inconsistent with his rationalism.

Having correctly identified the symptoms of modern sickness (anomie, alienation, etc.) and their cause (the waning of ideology and abstractness of scientific thought), Kracauer takes a fatal turn down the wrong track by prematurely dismissing the possibilities that ideology offers. Kracauer notes, мthe question as to whether or not ideology has had its heyday is a sham question which only obscures the issue at stake[, namely] . . . the conditions alone under which such beliefs are accessible to us todayо (295-296). He is content that since the waning of ideology is a historical trend, the potential of ideology to secure objective meaning and guidance for us need not be reconsidered in the modern world.

Kracauerнs disregard for the potential of revealed ideology seems to be related in part to his view that attempts to rehabilitate faith in revealed truth are мanti-intellectualisticо (290). For example, he cannot see how to мreplace [or restore] traditional beliefs and yet continue to endorse scienceо; this is, in fact, мprecisely the snagо (295). While I am not calling for rehabilitating faith (as if it had been injured and needed to be infused with a new energy or new essence as Kracauer describes Toynbee doing), I am calling for a reassessment of modernism in light of the reasonable hope that revelation has always-and continues to-hold out to humankind. It is just this reasonableness which Kracauer doubts and which demands from me a clear definition of reason and a clear explanation of the relationship of reason to faith in revealed Biblical truth. Given this definition, Kracauerнs snag may well be removed. Reason in the Christian view is based on Aristotelian logic: it defines truth as against falsehood. If something can be proven false, it is not true; if something can be proven true, it is not false. Carnell provides our definition of faith: the мresting of the soul in the sufficiency of evidenceо (70). Faith does not pretend to certainty-мwe live by faith, not by sightо (2 Corinthians 5:17)-but it is not an epistemological trick to bypass rationality and protect its dogma from testability, either. Blaise Pascal summarizes the relationship of faith and reason well: мFaith certainly tells us what the senses do not, but not the contrary of what they see; it is above, not against themо (Pascal 85). This view of faith and reason works well with our test of systematic consistency, for it lets us test the Bibleнs claims on the basis of reason, affirming our rationality. Meanwhile, faith in Biblical revelation allows us to transcend the limits of reason, providing spiritual clothing for our "spiritual nakedness," i.e. affirming the spirituality. Moreover, revelation does not require people to make a modernistic leap from rationalism to nonrational meaning, thus negating them as creatures of reason. In short, it affirms the whole person. It thus maintains its authoritative, revelational quality, while still allowing for verification, thus allowing for an epistemological methodology through which it emerges unscathed, while false ideologies that venture into the real world of testability are eliminated. Simultaneously and mutually affirming both matter and spirit, cognitive and experiential, reason and nonreason, revelatory epistemology follows Einsteinнs dictum: мScience without religion is lame; religion without science is blind.о From this point of view, Kracauerнs argument that capitalistic Ratio has applied reason, not too much but too little, can be applied to him: Kracauer reasons too little, because reason мis merely feeble if it does not go as far as to realize [its proper realm and limitations]о (Pascal 85). As we will see later, Kracauer's "anti-intellectualistic" polemic may apply much better to his own system.

Kracauer apparently finds further justification for dismissing ideology on the grounds of historical considerations, which are part of our vertical test for systematic consistency. Before continuing, we need to answer the problems for Biblical revelation posed by specific historical events, such as Fascism and the Crusades; here we invoke the test of fruitfulness. Before we do so, we must remember that Kracauer is a relativist and he has no basis for his moral claims that something is wrong with Totalitarianism. In other words, we do not need to answer his objection for him, because his own system cannot support such an objection; nevertheless, we will consider the objection because it does stand as a legitimate moral objection within the system of Biblical revelation (i.e. we need to explore data that suggest Biblical revelation fails the test of fruitfulness). To do so, we must go back to our definition of faith as the "resting of the soul in the sufficiency of evidence" (Carnell 70). If not this, "then faith is either a resting of the soul in the brute authority of another or in the testimony of the heart" (Carnell 70). Kracauer's suspicion of absolutes on the grounds that they can have a similar totalitarian function is a legitimate concern. Absolutes must by definition come from an absolute authority. Kracauer reads history correctly when he sees the danger in investing a person (e.g. Hitler) or an institution (e.g. the Catholic Church) with absolute authority, and basing faith on authoritative decrees. However, Kracauer's suspicions apply to faith "as a resting of the soul in the brute authority of another" and not to faith as "a resting of the soul in the sufficiency of evidence." Faith referenced to a subjective, human authority is indeed dangerous-it can steamroll over inconsistencies and individuals as it sees fit. Faith in Biblical authority derives from the sufficiency of evidence, not from the authoritative decree of a subjective, human source. As E.J. Carnell notes, beginning with a quote from B.B. Warfield,

The Bible consistently emphasizes testing of prophets and propositions of faith: "Test everything. Hold on to the good" (1 Thessalonians 5:21); "Watch out for false prophets. They come to you in sheep's clothing, but inside they are ferocious wolves. By their fruit you will recognize them" (Matthew 7:15-16); Deuteronomy 13:1-5; Deuteronomy 18:22). In contrast, Kracauer ends up adopting the third type of faith, "a resting of the soul in the testimony of the heart." Like faith in unsubstantiated authority, this form of faith is equally untestable. Kracauer's experience of revelation through film has as much validity in a relativistic system as Hitler's experience that he is called to rule the world. His fear that final truth leads to intolerance in fact highlights the fact that мOn the contrary it is the finality of Christianity which preserves tolerance for tomorrow. If all truth is relative, then the truth that we should be tolerant is also relativeо (Carnell 221). Kracauer's objection highlights the contradictions of his own theory, pointing the way to Christian Biblical revelation as giving far more fruitful and logically consistent answers to his objections than his own theory can give.

However, at this point Kracauer might argue that our definition of faith and our location of Christian authority in the Bible and not in the institutional Church is a Protestant notion that is basically speculative and divorced from the Jesus of history. In disproving this claim, we appeal to history to demonstrate that the infallibility of the institutional Church was an errant post-apostolic development. In the first few centuries of the Christian era, Gnostic philosophy and persecution posed serious challenges to the unity and doctrinal integrity of the various communities of Christians planted by the apostles throughout the Mediterranean. In order to deal with Gnostic heresy and to preserve unity, early church leaders drafted creeds and strengthened the authority and organization of the churches into the institutional, universal (catholic) Church. Ignatius, Irenaeus, Cyprian, and Augustine played key roles in this process. Ignatius, the Bishop of Antioch martyred in AD 117, wrote a famous letter to the Smyrnaeans in which he advocated the establishment of a hierarchical structure to govern the then-independent Christian communities and insisted that baptisms and love feasts were unlawful without a bishop. The Eucharist, too, needed to be administered by a bishop or someone he appointed. As these stipulations were widely enacted, a clergy-laity caste system began to develop. Irenaeus (130-212), an apologist, advocated a political unity to express the spiritual unity of the churches in his Against Heresies. This political unity was to be maintained by a perpetual succession of bishops from Christ. These ideas were key in the institutionalization of the Church. Cyprian, a Bishop of Carthage and third century martyr, contributed the idea of an unbroken, apostolic succession beginning with Peter. He is known for such statements as мif anyone is not with the bishop, he is not with the Churchо and мYou cannot have God for your father unless you have the Church for your motherо (Petersen 91). In other words, there could be no salvation outside of the institutional church. Augustine (354-431), Bishop of Hippo, wrote City of God, which completed the institutionalization of the church by joining the stateнs power of coercion with the churchнs role of internal transformation, an alliance made possible by the emperor Constantine and his successors. Augustine also taught that people, even in the Church, could never be certain of their salvation long as in mortal flesh, giving the church powers over heaven and hell. Neither Jesus nor the New Testament writers ever suggested that structure and institutionalization be used as means to preserve unity and order among the churches. Jesus foretold the coming of many false Christs and promised his followers the Holy Spirit (Matthew 24:24, John 14:16-17); Paul told Christians in Ephesus, мEven from among your own number men will arise and distort the truth . . . Now I commit you to God and to the word of his graceо Acts 20:30,32). Johnнs first epistle, deliberately responding to the Gnostic heresy (cf. 1:1-3, 4:2), propounds a rational test to distinguish orthodox from heretical; it says nothing about institutions however. Even aware of the heresies and divisions to come, both Jesus and Paul entrusted Christians to God and not to an organizational structure. In fact, nowhere in the New Testament is an institutional church advocated for any reason. As the political and moral corruption of the clergy grew, a string of reformers advocated the return to the authority of the Bible without the mediation of the Church: Wyclif (1328-1384), Hus (1373-1415), Erasmus (1466-1536), Luther (1483-1546), and Calvin (1509-1564). Much more history could be detailed, but this suffices to make the basic point that the absolute authority of the church was not among the earliest teachings of Jesus or the apostles who wrote the New Testament.

I anticipate at this point Kracauer would charge that the Bible is no less subjective an authority than Hitler or the Catholic Church. As a dialectical materialist, he would probably insist that the Bible is no more than a product of its socio-historical context. Before we answer these charges, we should quickly point out that this sociology of knowledge interpretation of history is self-refuting in the same way the relativism is self-refuting. It claims to have absolute knowledge (that all knowledge is relative) when its own premise requires that even this knowledge is not immune to the relativity of the socio-historical conditions in which it emerged. Now we return to the question of Biblical authority, which will take some time to answer. There are five questions to address with regard to Biblical authority: 1) On what basis does the Christian claim divine authority for a group of historical documents clearly written by historical individuals?, 2) Cannot the Bible be interpreted however one wants to interpret it?, 3) Has not Biblical criticism furnished naturalistic explanations for New Testament events that are more plausible than supernaturalistic explanations?, 4) Does not the Bible contradict itself?, and 5) Does not the Bible contradict science?

We shall start with the first question, the epistemology of Biblical authority. Our reasoning process goes like this: 1) The Gospels are historically reliable 2) In them, Jesus claims to be God, a claim substantiated by the resurrection, 2) What Christ (who is God) says is true, 3) Christ taught that the Hebrew scriptures were the unbreakable, written word of God, and 4) Jesus authorized the apostles, and only the apostles, to discharge the gospel, including authorization for writing the New Testament (Geisler 353). What is being argued is not that God dictated a book that was in heaven (as the Quнranic view of inspiration holds), nor that every word is literally true (we must interpret according to the writersн intents and genres), but that мmen spoke from God as they were carried along by the Holy Spiritо (2 Peter 1:21). Both the voice of God and the individual writersн voices are simultaneously conveyed in the Scriptures. Each step in this argument will require some treatment. First, we will show that the Gospels are historically reliable as the writings of eyewitnesses of Jesus or close associates within several decades of his death, too short a time for major change to occur in Jewish oral traditions. We start with the Luke-Acts composition, purportedly written as a two part composition for Theophilus by a companion of Paul. Lukan authorship is substantiated by the high quality of the Greek, the use of medical terminology, the "we" passages of Acts, and the obvious personal familiarity of the writer with the events described (Geisler 312). Since the book of Acts abruptly ends with no mention of Paul's martyrdom in AD 67, it is reasonable to assume Luke-Acts was written around AD 62, when the last events in described in Acts occurred. Since source criticism has given convincing evidence that Matthew and Luke used Mark as a source, we can date Mark between AD 50 and AD 60 and Matthew and Luke around AD 60 to 70. The typically later dating by liberal scholars is based solely on their naturalistic bias, which requires that the gospels be written after the fall of Jerusalem as predicted in the Gospels, since prophecy cannot occur, and to allow time for a high Christology to evolve. External evidence (which there are no solid reasons to doubt) of authorship and dating from Irenaeus, a student of Polycarp (who was himself a disciple to the apostle John) catalogs Mark's gospel as written by a disciple and interpreter of Peter, and John's gospel as written by the Apostle John in Ephesus (Montgomery 33-34). Here, the external evidence confirms the internal claims John (cf. 19:35) and Luke (cf. 1:1-4) make about presenting eyewitness accounts. Much more can and should be said on the issue of historicity, but for the present we must proceed to the next issue. Jesus's claims to be God are numerous and take numerous forms (e.g. claiming divine attributes, divine authority, accepting worship as divinity, etc.) but we will mention only one for the sake of brevity: "I say to you, before Abraham was, I AM" (John 8:58). The claim of Jesus to be God must be examined in light of the resurrection (which we will discuss shortly) and in light of his ethical teachings and moral character; the possibility that he was merely an outstanding moral teacher does not vertically fit the facts of his claims to the God.

As for Jesus's teaching that the Hebrew scriptures are God's word, we will cite three examples among many: Jesus answers skeptics by appealing to the testimony of the Father about him (Jesus) in the Scriptures (John 5:36-40). On other occasions, Jesus says that the Hebrew Scriptures (variously designated by "the Law" and "the Law and Prophets") cannot be broken and will not pass away until "everything is accomplished" (John 10:35, Matthew 5:17). Jesus's testimony, as external evidence concerning the divine origin and infallibility of the Hebrew scriptures supports comparable internal claims from these writings themselves.

As to Jesus's authorization of the apostles to write the New Testament, we will look at a few examples of many which could be cited. Jesus provided for the writing of the New Testament by the apostles, when he told them, "The Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, will teach you all things and will remind you of everything I have said to you . . . when he, the Spirit of Truth comes, he will guide you into all truth" (John 14:26, 16:13). Further, Jesus' told his disciples, "whoever listens to you listens to me; he who rejects you rejects me; but he who rejects me rejects him who sent me" (Luke 10:16). Jesus authorized the disciples to speak in his place, i.e. in the place of God, including in their writings. Writings which were legitimately apostolic (i.e. written by eyewitnesses of the risen Christ) were approved as canonical and non-apostolic writings were rejected by the Church. Note, too, these claims of Jesus support various internal claims of the apostles themselves to have been authorized by Jesus and writers of Scripture (e.g. 2 Peter 3:15-16, Galatians 1:1, Romans 16:25-26). Paul, for example, aware of his apostolic authority, does not admonish the Galatians for welcoming him as if he were "an angel of God, or even . . . Christ Jesus himself" (Galatians 4:14). Additional external evidence that the apostles were uniquely authorized by Jesus comes from early church figures such as Clement and Justin Martyr (M'Ilvaine 403, 405). Ignatius, for example, said in AD 110, "I do not, like Peter or Paul, issue you with commands, for I am not an apostle." There was an awareness from the time of the apostles onward, that only the apostles had the authorization to write Scripture. Transferring this authority to the institutional church was a move unsupported by Jesus.

The next question on Biblical authority is the question about multiple interpretations. There is no question that the Bible has been interpreted in numerous different ways. We acknowledge that people can interpret the Bible however they want . . . if that is what they want to do. In other words, when people come to the text with an agenda of what they want it to say, they can then impose their interpretive scheme on it-some with more success than others. However, for the student who approaches the Bible wanting to learn what it says, using the grammatio-historical method of inquiry, a fairly consistent understanding emerges of what the text means. The two approaches can be characterized as using the Bible as a tool to fortify oneнs already-held agenda or using it to learn what it actually says to the unbiased reader who interacts with the text responsibly and with integrity. The major exception to this rule is the two major interpretations reached based on the presuppositions of naturalism and supernaturalism. These presuppositions are essential to understand what Biblical criticism has and has not accomplished. In order to evaluate the conclusions of the two schools of interpretation, we must turn to the text itself without making either presupposition and see which set of presuppositions it vindicates, which brings us to the question of Biblical criticism.

We begin our evaluation of liberal (naturalistic) Biblical criticism by weighing naturalistic and supernaturalistic presuppositions. In our analysis, we will neither assume that miracles can occur nor assume that they cannot occur. We choose to analyze the resurrection with respect to the events before and after, since the historicity of the resurrection is the crux of Christian faith, the point on which it stands or falls (1 Corinthians 15: 14-19). We will simply look for the most reasonable explanation of the event we are analyzing. The liberal view holds that the religious experience of Easter caused the disciples to turn the pre-Easter man Jesus into the post-Easter Christ. We have three forms of factual evidence: 1) Accounts of the empty tomb, 2) Accounts of appearances of the risen Jesus in the Gospels and 1 Corinthians, and 3) the birth of the Christian church distinct from Judaism through zealous apostles. The historicity of the Gospels need not even be assumed for this argument-by calling the accounts historical evidence, we are merely saying that the accounts were written in history, not that the accounts tell what really happened, for that would require us to assume supernaturalism. The supernatural view takes the events as described in the Bible. It stands on the grounds of its supernaturalistic assumptions. Can naturalism explain Easter, accounting for all the facts involved, such that its explanation is as tenable as the supernatural explanation, thereby justifying the skepticнs unbelief? Or does the naturalistic explanation fail to account for all the facts, leaving us to accept the more systematically consistent explanation of supernaturalism? We can also assume that the resurrection does not matter, so we need not bother trying to discover if it happened or not; however, this reflects a decided ignorance of the far-reaching implications of the resurrection if it did indeed happen. We will look at various naturalistic explanations for the facts and examine problems with them. The first suggestion is that the accounts were fabricated, that the disciples knew Jesus never actually rose, and that the resurrection accounts were written either as a mythical expression of their new faith. This explanation must ignore the teaching of Paul that the resurrection event is accredited by eyewitnesses (1 Corinthians 15:3-8), i.e. that the earliest Christians taught as historical what they knew was mythical, and that none of the eyewitnesses, Christian or pagan, raised any objection to this. If they fabricated the accounts as propaganda to convince others to accept their faith, we must account for the fact that those who knew Jesus was still dead went independently to their deaths as martyrs for preaching that he was alive. The second suggestion was that Jesus never really died, that he revived in the tomb from a swoon, and convinced the disciples he rose from the dead. This explanation faces the difficulties of what happened to Jesus afterwards (which the disciples apparently did not care about at all), of a dubious premise in light of the experience and effectiveness of Roman executioners, and of his self-extrication from a tomb blocked by a huge stone such as archeologists have found around Jerusalem. A third suggestion, that the women went to the wrong tomb-an empty one, requires us to believe that no one, including the disciples and Joseph of Arimathea (whose tomb Jesus was buried in) went to the trouble to check the facts for themselves. Another suggestion, that the body was stolen, lacks any convincing motive for possible thieves. Neither the Jewish authorities nor the Romans had any incentive for stealing the body; in fact, they had every reason to leave it in the tomb. If the disciples stole it, we cannot then explain their subsequent lives and deaths based on what they knew was a lie. If someone else stole it for an unknown reason, most likely he or she would have produced it to refute the disciples when they started preaching the resurrection (Chapman 282-286).

Perhaps the most promising proposal is that the disciples had a hallucination that made them sincere believers in the risen Jesus, though indeed he had not actually risen. However, Paul's letter claims that there are more than five hundred eyewitnesses of the risen Christ; it is unlikely they all had the same experience. More importantly, hallucinations take the form of seeing things that are in one's mind, and Jesus's resurrection differed markedly from "the messianic understanding expectations and the concepts of resurrection in first-century Palestinian Judaism" (Moreland175). Moreover, this theory still has to resort to one of the other explanations to explain the empty tomb account, and all these explanations are problematic. Finally, there are certain additional features of the early church which support the supernatural view. First, the disciples were radically transformed through whatever happened at Easter-from uneducated fishermen, peasants, and shepherds crushed by the execution of their rabbi to a confident mission society, convinced of its salvation and preaching with great effectiveness and courage. Hallucinations seem unlikely to explain the extent of the transformation. Second, key social structures in Judaism were changed virtually overnight: 1) the need for offering sacrifices was regarded as obsolete, 2) dietary and Sabbath-keeping prescriptions of the Torah were no longer considered normative, 3) clear-cut non-Trinitarian monotheism was abrogated by the identification of Jesus with God (as in the early Aramaic expression, Maranatha, which addresses Christ as Mar, another name applied to YHWH in the Dead Sea Scrolls), 4) the concept of messiah changed from that of a victorious political king liberating Jews from Roman occupation to that of a crucified leader who established a church by rising from the dead, 5) Baptism changed from a symbol of repentance to a symbol of participation in Jesus's crucifixion and resurrection (Moreland 179). Each of these transformations is quite difficult to accord with any naturalistic explanation of what happened on Easter. Attempts to explain these transformations through the influence of Hellenism, mystery religions, and Gnostic redeemer myths fail to recognize that "both the general milieu of the Gospels and specific features of the resurrection narratives give overwhelming evidence that the early church was rooted in Judaism" (Moreland 181). In examining the resurrection, we see that the events can be adequately explained only if we accept supernaturalism.

Our next question concerns Biblical contradictions. There is no question that our present text contains contradictions. However, the manuscripts from which our present text is compiled were not the originals (the divinely-inspired autographs). While the manuscript evidence for the accuracy of transmission of the New Testament is unparalleled among ancient documents, some textual transmission errors have undoubtedly crept in. Such copyist errors can solve many numerical contradictions in the text. Still, other textual problems exist, for example discrepancies between the resurrection narratives. While problems do exist in the text, they are of minor nature and do not affect any of the key doctrines of the Bible. Either there are indeed supernatural forces involved with the New Testament or there are not. Neither answer is without problem, yet one must be true. We must accept the one that vertically fits the facts best. As we have seen with relation to Biblical criticism, the supernatural explanation of the Jesus events better fits the facts, so we choose to hold to Biblical inspiration despite its minor problems. Carnell adds an insightful comment on persistent minor difficulties: мIt would be philosophically stupid to jettison Christianity, however, because of [such] difficult[ies]. A rational man settles for that position which is attended by the fewest difficulties, not one which is unattended by anyо (Carnell 111). Similarly, science maintains the mechanical theory of natural phenomena despite the Heisenburg uncertainty principle; moreover, the mechanistic theory is still fruitful in leading to advances in science. So long as we are not yet in possession of complete information (indeed only very limited facts), nothing but outright foolishness can drive us to abandon a worldview with, as yet, minor difficulties, when there is no worldview free from difficulties, and when most (if not all) of the alternatives have far more significant difficulties (as in Kracauerнs bifurcated epistemology) and offer far less fruitful solutions (as in Kracauerнs relativism and redemption through experiencing film).

Now we can look at the alleged inconsistencies between science and the Bible. To start, we need to recognize that empirical science is based on a mechanistic assumption about the universe which, like liberal Biblical criticism, a priori precludes the supernatural, denying even the possibility for miracles or revelation on which Christianity rests. In other words, in testing Biblical revelation for vertical fitting of scientific facts, we cannot impose philosophical presuppositions on it from outside its own system. We can test how well it fits the facts, but we cannot insist that it agree with theories based on philosophical presuppositions which are antithetical to its system. The Bible has been accused of Geocentricism, understandably since the Church Inquisition demanded that Galileo recant the heliocentric theory. However, when the Bible says, мThe sun rises and the sun sets, and hurries back to where it risesо (Ecclesiastes 1:5), it is surely an unnatural use of the text, speaking from the frame-of-reference of the earth, to accuse it of making a scientific claim of geocentricism. Nonetheless, this is just how the Catholic church used it, no doubt due to its canonization of Aristotelian and Ptolemaic natural philosophy. Another objection frequently raised is the Joshua 10 account of the sun standing still. However, if we bypass the alleged problem of geocentricism, we can suggest that the common objection to this event, like the common objection to such events as the parting of the Red Sea comes out of an a priori rejection of miracles. Similar arguments about Biblical cosmology such as references to мthe four corners of the earthо can more naturally be seen as observations from the frame of reference of a person than as cosmological descriptions. The age of the universe is another oft-cited problem. However, the Genesis creation account does not mandate six twenty-four-hour periods in which the universe was created. The Hebrew word, yom, translated мdayо in English can refer to periods of indeterminate lengths of time, as well as to twelve hour periods and to twenty-four hour periods. As with Galileo and geocentricism, the Churchнs unjustified dogmatism on the age of the earth as given by Archbishop James Usshnerнs chronology, has lead to a mistaken general notion of a conflict with science about the age of the universe (Carnell 111).

Probably the most significant question with regard to science is the conflict between Genesis and the theory of evolution. The scientific facts with which the theory is constructed upon the backbone of naturalism are what must be addressed-not the naturalistic form of the theory. The bare facts include: structural and genetic similarities between humans and animals, and fossils indicating that species are not fixed, i.e. that some evolution has occurred from common ancestors. The Genesis account states that God created certain мkinds,о which there is no reason to assume must correspond to the мspeciesо described by science. The мkindsо-most significantly, humans- were created independently and are unrelated. The account does not insist on the fixity of species (as disproved by scientific fact), but on the fixity of мkinds.о Also, the fact of structural similarities does not vindicate the evolutionary theory over the Genesis account, for God may have created creatures with similar structures. The same can be said for genetic data used to support the evolutionary theory. However, the Genesis account is vindicated over evolutionary theory in the way it vertically fits the fact of the fossil gaps between the orders or мkinds,о which evolutionists must explain away as missing links-which are still missing (Carnell 236-239).

Now we finaly return to Kracauer. Kracauer's historical grounds for dismissing ideology are not limited to specific historical events. He also objects to efforts (like ours) to revive ideology as inconsistent with his Enlightenment philosophy of history: "the historical process [is] a process of demythologization" (Kracauer, Ornament 80). We will proceed to answer Kracauer's historical objections on the basis of his philosophy of history by calling into question the legitimacy of that philosophy of history. In other words, since he interprets history in terms of progress, reviving ideology for him simply will not do (since ideology is regressive); but this critique is only as solid as the assumption of progress on which it rests. Pre-Enlightenment ideas are only reactionary if you assume progress. To test the progress assumption, we must ask if specific historical events vindicate or discredit this interpretive scheme. Belief in progress is a difficult assumption to sustain in the modern world of Fascism, Nazism, the Holocaust, two world wars, the atomic bomb, and the alienated condition of humanity. Appropriately, Kracauer notes that мscience, which at one time seemed synonymous with reason, is actually indifferent to the form of our society and to progress other than technological.о He also observes that peopleнs faith in reasonнs directive power has been мdiscredited also by social and political developments which rather vindicate Freudнs ultimate forebodingsо (290). Franco Ferrarotti offers this critique of the notion of inevitable progress: мThe fight for emancipation from tradition . . . prepares a new despotism, that of anti-traditionalism, the tyranny of progress as a necessary law of historical development. . . . Nobody can deny the importance and positive contribution of the challenge to tradition, but it is clear the equation of tradition and error is simplistic and utterly unsustainableо (Franco 20-21). In light of the historical realities of the modern age, Ferrarotti seems correct in pointing to the false assumption of anti-traditionalism and progress that inform Kracauerнs judgments against ideology.

To be fair to Kracauer, we must consider how he interprets the socio-political historical events which have discredited Enlightenment rationalism. To Kracauer, these events reveal мcapitalismнs core defect: it rationalizes not too much but rather too littleо (Kracauer, Ornament 81). мSo,о he writes, мreason itself eludes [people at large] all the more, turning from a substantive entity into an anemic notionо (290). This raises the issue of how Kracauer defines reason. Kracauer appears to derive his definition of reason from his assumption of progress and of what progress is. He writes, мThe thinking prompted by capitalism resists culminating in that reason which arises from the basis of manо (Kracauer, Ornament 81). He later adds that in the modern capitalistic world, мdark forces of nature continue to rebel ever more threateningly, thereby preventing the advent of the man of reasonо (Kracauer, Ornament 83). In other words, true reason-as distinct from the capitalistic Ratio (which мis not reason itself but a murky reason [in that] . . . it does not encompass manо)-is thinking which brings nature under the control of humankind via demythologizing the world.

To better understand his definition of reason and view of progress, it is helpful to refer to Max Horkheimer, a contemporary thinker. Horkheimer further explains the direct connection of reason to liberation from natureнs control: мThe propositions of idealistic philosophy that reason distinguishes man from the animal . . . contain the truth that through reason man frees himself from the fetters of natureо (Arato 47). Horkheimer goes on to relate reason to the barbarism of the modern world:

In a rather complicated and artificial way, this reasoning allows Kracauer and Horkheimer to interpret the regress of modern man as a necessary stage in the progress of humanity toward freedom from all natural forces of control (necessary because reason's self-destruction precedes true freedom). It also enables them to brand revelational ideology as мunreasonableо according to their definition of reason, for reason consists of self-generated truths such that man is the measure and not the means. However, this argument boils down to merely a restatement of rationalistic presuppositions. While their account of the мself-destruction of the Enlightenmentо might possibly be true, a critical observer can readily see that it is artificially constructed around a certain unquestioned presupposition of progress: it redefines reason in terms of this certain view of progress, and reinterprets socio-political realities in completely speculative ways to preserve that same notion of progress. No unbiased observers would ever interpret events this way unless they assumed progress. Far more realistic and likely in view of modern realities is the revelatory view: мMen, it is in vain that you seek within yourselves the cure for all your miseries. All your intelligence can only bring you to realize that it is not within yourselves that you will find either truth or goodо (Pascal 77). C.E.M. Joad, a convert to Christianity from agnosticism, makes similar remarks about the blindness of progress to the moral condition of humanity:

Revelation is far more safe than rationalism, too. The supposed nobility of making humans the measure is not only dubious, but downright suicidal for meaning: since humans are finite, and meaningfulness requires an infinite reference point (Sartre), there can be no meaning for human life. If one argues that meaning can be had without absolutes, a terminological debate ensues in which it becomes clear that what the relativist means by мmeaningо is not what has historically been understood as meaning: the kind of knowledge of oneнs place in the universe which answers the modern problem of anomie. Once again, the problems with Kracauerнs rationalism illuminate the reason and power of revelational ideology, as a model, and finally, as offering a solution.

Having evaluated Kracauerнs persistent adherence to the notion of progress in view of his dubious definition of reason (derived from his assumption) and in light of socio-political realities of the modern world, it is clear that this adherence to progress is unjustified and uncritical-that it fails the test of systematic coherence with regard to history. Kracauer dismisses strong evidence that modernism and rationalism are failed enterprises on the grounds of modernistic and rationalistic assumptions of progress: the worst kind of circular reasoning! Moreover, since his assumption of progress is the only remaining reason he has to ignore ideology in his method, we can finally conclude that his method is fundamentally uncritical and inadequate.

Having completed our critique of Kracauerнs methodology, we can now proceed to see the fruit of the solution he reaches, most of which we have already predicted from the flaws in his methodology. Kracauerнs solution to the crisis of modernity through the film experience contradicts his basic rationalistic premises and proves highly problematic when one attempts to apply it. мWe want [to show] concrete fact with a highlight thrown on what is relevant to its preciousness,о he writes (296). Two problems surface here. First, there is no guarantee that a film image tells us the truth. Kracauer makes this point himself, noting that though pictures taken on the spot have the appearance of presenting irrefutable evidence, they can obviously lie-which makes film an мincomparable instrument of propagandaо (160). The danger of misuse by propagandists, while significant, is not the core of the problem, though. The core of the problem is that there is no way to tell the truth from a lie. Kracauer, as a relativist, has no right to tell propagandists that they are lying. All he can say is that the truth should conform to his notion of progress-but his notion of progress is just as relative as the propagandists' messages. Only absolutes (derived epistemologically through revelation) can close the doors against harmful usage by propagandists. Indeed, only absolutes can even identify what harmful usage is in any kind of objective sense. Kracauer's theory allows for all sorts of excesses and dangers in his open call for nonrational imagistic satisfaction of the hunger for life. The second problem is this: relevancy and preciousness are judgments in the realm of ideas, not objective, obvious material realities. Kracauer, as a relativist, cannot carelessly refer to relevancy and preciousness as if these were objective elements inherent in the object.

Furthermore, Kracauerнs solution demands that spectators go beyond just seeing a relevant image; to be redeemed, they must мincorporate [an object] into [them] so that they grasp its being and dynamics from within-a sort of blood transfusionо (297). Kracauer shares Marcelнs mystical vision that film will deepen and render more intimate млour relation to this earth which is our habitatно (304). This kind of experiential contact with reality, which he further describes as мseizing [reality] and shak[ing] hands with itо (297), cannot generate truth through the application of reason, thought, or reflection. While this mystical experience accords with his basically religious view that humans have spiritual needs, it contradicts his rationalistic epistemological premises by advocating experientially-derived truth. Kracauerнs romantic, mystical solution contradicts his own belief that the rejection of romantic illusions is "indeed judicious" (295). What is perhaps even more significant is that Kracauer cannot even say what that reality is which he wants us to experience. In trying to define "reality," he reverts to such definitions as "life as such," which he as a relativist, cannot even posit. He apparently assumes reality has something to do with the earth (hence his concern with making the earth our home), but this assumption has no more validity than the assumption that the material world is an illusion or a nasty trick, or that we are spirits trapped in bodies awaiting our true home somewhere else. Relativism cannot allow much productive or meaningful thinking to occur, so it is important that we not allow Kracauer to sneak absolutes into his system.

While not directly a part of his discussion of film's redemptive solution, Kracauer's identification of film with escapism and voyeurism points to further weaknesses and dangers in his solution-given that the solution depends on a medium he sees as escapist and voyeuristic. For example, note the explicit escapism in this statement: мFilm . . . permits especially the lonely spectator to fill his shrinking self-with images of life as such [which] . . . are so profoundly satisfactory to [him] because they offer him routes of escape into the mirage-like world of concrete objects, striking sensations, and unusual opportunitiesо (170). Similarly, Kracauer notes that film мaffords temporary relief to the мwidespread feeling of impotenceо by granting its spectators мimaginary omnipotenceо (171). Apparently, Kracauer is willing to accept a solution which is temporary, pragmatic, and imaginary-escapist. Kracauer notes the drug-like effect of film which мlulls the mind,о and causes spectators to relinquish their control in a process of мdissolutionо (189). From every indication, Kracauer thinks the escapism in these examples is good. It seems that Kracauer endorses escapism since it offers profound satisfaction to the lonely, alienated, impotent modern person. This is exactly the kind of weak, diluted solution to which relativism is necessarily limited, as noted earlier.

Kracauerнs voyeuristic tendencies come out in his statement that the lonely and alienated moviegoer мis attracted to the cinema because it gives him the illusion of vicariously partaking of life in its fullnessо (169). Kracauer appears to applaud filmнs ability to thus meet the needs of lonely, alienated people, even if it achieves this solution through an illusion and through voyeuristic vicarious experiences. Voyeurism emerges elsewhere as well: мWhat redeems the film addict from his isolation is . . . the sight of people mingling and communing . . .о (170). The alienated individual sees pictures of people engaged in meaningful relationships-which he does not have-and seeing these pictures of what he does not have supposedly redeems him. Maybe so, but this kind of voyeuristic redemption offers only an artificial, illusory solution, a мcontentment devoid of contentо (290).

Kracauerнs vision of using film to create ideological propositions in a bottom-to-top manner proves to be yet another colossal failure, just as predicted. Kracauer states, мwe actually do not confine ourselves to absorbing [images] but feel stimulated to weave what they are telling us into contexts that bear on the whole of our existenceо (308). He goes on to identify these larger contexts, as ideology: мThe large waves roused in the soul bring ashore propositions regarding the significance of the things we fully experience. Films which satisfy our desire for such propositions may well reach into the dimension of ideologyо (308-309). Kracauerнs use the word actually signals us to the fact that he suspects we didnнt realize that he intended to rebuild new ideologies, and that this is just an unforeseen bonus. However, careful analysis of his assessment of the modern condition and human needs, which reached into the metaphysical and ideological sphere, allowed us to predict he would indeed need to invoke ideology eventually, even though he was so unwilling to allow for it earlier. Kracauer justifies his differing treatment of revelational ideology and film-catalyzed self-generated ideology by contrasting the top-to-bottom model with the bottom-to-top model. It hardly needs to be said that this justification derives from his rationalistic assumptions about Truth as exclusively self-generated knowledge. It seems that Kracauerнs loyalty to the bottom-to-top model also derives from hope that the inductive method, starting from pure empiricism, will create an ideology with some objectivity. However, he states, мall attempts to establish a hierarchy among these propositions or messages [which films evolve inductively] have proved futile so farо (309). Moreover, he writes, мThe range of equally legitimate propositions is inexhaustibleо (310). In other words, ideology generated through film experience via bottom-to-top methodology is completely relative. It offers neither mankind nor art any kind of guidance; Fascism may be revived through film at any moment. Nor does it offer any protection against harmful and false dogma, for everything film produces is мequally legitimate.о

It is significant that this relativistic solution can be criticized by Kracauerнs own words and declared to be a non-solution. Kracauer writes that abstractness, which prevents us from escaping spiritual nakedness, is frequently generated in the modern world through мrelativistic reductionо (293). So, Kracauerнs theory takes us full circle back to where we started. We generate via film ideological propositions to transcend abstractness and alleviate our spiritual nakedness, but the only propositions we can generate are completely relativized, reduced to a common status of мequally legitimate.о Kracauerнs solution is a relativized reduction; it generates only increasing abstraction, fails to resolve the modern crisis, opens up a closet-full of Pandoraнs boxes, and brings us right back to our starting point: abstractedness. Moreover, we are just as alienated from one another as before, since redemption through nonrational experience leaves us unable to rationally discuss meaning or truth at all-the meaning is contained in an ineffable experience.

Having pointed out the logical contradictions in Kracauer's system, the question arises, "Is he justified in adopting a bifurcated epistemology-making the leap from his rationalism to mystical redemption through experiencing film images?" Our inquiry may appear hasty and short-sighted in its critique of Kracauer for making his leap, and perhaps even blind in missing the humanity of Kracauer's efforts. Assuredly this is not the case. We admire Kracauer for his appreciation of the modern condition and for seeing the need for redemption. We admire his concern for spirituality and for reason. However, just as our holistic concern for people leads us to applaud Kracauer for his affirmation of the spiritual part of humans, so too it insists that we also affirm the rational part of humans, which is crushed by taking the leap. Mary Shideler writes, "Men and women develop theologies [and philosophies] when, having found life puzzling to their minds and disturbing to their hearts, they try to work out an understanding of life that will satisfy their intellectual honor and their hearts' needs" (Shideler 9). We can compromise neither the hearts' need nor the intellectual honor at stake in the leap so long as either such compromise is not absolutely necessary. Kracauer's solution requires that we accept a "monstrous total antithesis between rationality and meaning" (Schaeffer 58). Thus, it is our very concern for humanity which insists that we take Kracauer to task on his logical problems and mystical leap.

Nonetheless, Kracauer finds himself at a place in history when ideology is waning, and waning because a process of demythologizing has overwhelmed ideology. The notion of a systematically consistent worldview has been declared impossible in the nihilistic crisis marking the transition to postmodernism, and thus the bifurcated epistemology and the mystical leap are not only historical events, but historical necessities for anyone living after the nihilistic crisis. If this is truly the state of humanity, we are indeed pitiful and the leap must be accepted-if only to continue life in this pitiful state. Francis Schaeffer describes these historical steps as three levels of despair. Nihilism, the first level of despair, requires people to accept the conclusion that everything is meaningless and chaotic, a conclusion that made life all but unlivable. The second level of despair, presented as a solution to nihilistic despair, requires the acceptance of the total dichotomy between the "blind optimistic hope of meaning, based on a nonrational leap of faith" and "the rational and logical which gives no meaning" (Schaeffer 57). As noted earlier, this dichotomy divides individuals against themselves and compromises their rationality. It is indeed "a more profound form of despair" than nihilism (Schaeffer 58). The third level of despair, a search for revelation and meaning through contentless mysticism, became necessary when postmodern individuals were able to accept neither nihilism nor the total dichotomy with integrity. Kracauer's mysticism is indeed contentless: he tells us that watching the film will save us, even while noting that the film can be telling us anything so long as we get to shake hands with reality, since everything it might tell us is "equally legitimate" (310). In other words, we agree that Kracauer is following his rationalistic system out to its logical conclusion-the realization that rationalism failed and some sort of revelation has been necessitated. Some of the problems with mystical forms of revelation, including Kracauer's, as mentioned earlier, are their escapism, their voyeurism, their relativism, and their irrationality.

We suggest that the unacceptable corner Kracauer finds himself in is not an absolute historical necessity, but only a historical necessity in the context of rationalism. We suggest that humans can be rational without being rationalistic, i.e. that they can have a systematically consistent worldview without assuming that they have to generate it. Kracauer, we argue, is in the position of a child offered happiness, who refuses it because he insists on generating happiness himself, all the time knowing that his own efforts can never achieve happiness. In short, he is wrong because of his wrong epistemology, an epistemology which he must transgress (in order to fit the facts of human spiritual needs) even as he seeks to work within it. So, we maintain that in the marketplace of worldviews, Christian revelation offers humans the most systematically consistent worldview that is intellectually tenable and fruitful today; we seek not so much to demolish Kracauer's arguments as to help him find his way out of his own contradictions. In our answer to Kracauer's historical objections to Christian truth claims, we have addressed those reasons why Biblical revelation was rejected as systematically consistent in the process of history which led to the nihilistic crisis. We are now at the point of decision: rationalism or Biblical revelation.

Modern humanity is like a mouse in a maze which finds itself at a dead end. Kracauer realizes the dead-end condition of humanity; he realizes that the cause of this condition is the death of ideology. However, he then fails to process these observations to their logical conclusion: that modern humanity is in a cul-de-sac because it has been traveling down a road with no outlet (i.e. rationalism). Not only does he not reach this conclusion, but he does not even consider it a possibility worth considering. To make matters yet worse, he instead proposes a completely nonrational solution inconsistent with the very rationalistic presuppositions that drove him to ignore revelational ideology. Kracauer is like a mouse at a dead end who reasons that since he must be progressing toward the outlet of the maze, the walls surrounding him are not really walls at all (i.e. war, alienation, anomie do not disprove the social progress assumption). Then, believing that he can only solve the maze by walking through it on his own four feet (i.e. through self-generated Truth), the mouse then decides that he can escape his desperate situation, not by walking, but by looking fixedly (not abstractly) at the physical reality of the walls and mystically experiencing them. The analogy of the mouse in a maze not only highlights the defects of Kracauerнs methodology and his solution, but also illuminates the corresponding strengths, reason, and power of revelational ideology. Revelational ideology accurately assesses the modern condition, traces its symptoms to the underlying disease-unlike Kracauer, who merely treats the symptomatic abstractness and offers at best only temporary relief to the real disease-and returns to the straight corridor which it had been traveling down until it turned off onto the side-road of rationalism, which is of course the most reasonable and progressive thing to do when you find yourself at a dead end. So, the crisis of modernity calls for a sober reassessment of modernity that will enable mankind to deal with the modern crisis without having to settle for such non-solutions as Kracauerнs relativistic, voyeuristic escapism. The crisis of modernity, sensitizing modern humanity to its spiritual needs and to the necessity of absolutes, calls for a revival of reasonable faith in Christian Biblical revelation.

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